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Introduction
 On 18 June 1812, President Madison signed 
the Declaration of War against Britain. American 
public opinion, enraged by accusations of the 
Royal Navy’s disregard for U.S. sovereignty in 
relentlessly boarding American ships and 
impressing American seamen and British 
deserters, goaded its politicians into action. Since 
1807, America had endured the consequences 
of the British Orders in Council permitting the 
British navy to seize, on the open sea, any ship 
sailing a course for Napoleonic ports. This 
legislation devastated the western and 
southern U.S. export trade and caused serious 
economic hardship (Latimer 2007: 24).
 American war-hawk politicians in Kentucky, 
Ohio, and the territories also pressured loudly 
for war, arguing that British Indian agents 
fueled native unrest. Western expansionists 
spoke of driving the British out of North 
America, subduing native peoples, and 
opening the land for settlement. From their 
perspective, Canadian settlers’ destiny was 
liberation from British oppression (Berton 
1980: 25; Taylor 2011: 137). Time for action had 
arrived. They would strike against the tyrant in 
Upper and Lower Canada while Britain’s attention 
remained focused on the Napoleonic Wars.
 Major General Henry Dearborn, chosen to 
lead the northern campaign, laid out his strategy 
roughly based on a plan of attack suggested 
earlier by John Armstrong, military counselor 
to President Madison. Dearborn proposed a 
main thrust against Montreal to cut the St. 
Lawrence River supply line. To divide the 
attention of British regulars in Canada and to 
protect against native attacks on the western 
frontier, he also proposed a coordinated, 
multipronged invasion, sending U.S. forces, 
supported by militia brigades, to cross the 
Detroit, Niagara, and upper St. Lawrence 
rivers (Malcomson 2003: 29; Turner 2011: 82).
 At Quebec, Sir George Prevost, governor in 
Chief of British North America, was well 
aware of American disaffection with Britain’s 
ruthless actions. By December 1811, he 
acknowledged the increasingly apparent need to 
at least prepare the provinces against attack. 
The number of British regulars in the upper 
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 The Battle of Queenston Heights bears great significance for Canadian War of 1812 enthusiasts. 
This victory cemented Niagara Loyalists’ sympathy for the British cause and inspired militia units to stand 
against the American invasion of Upper Canada. When Major General Isaac Brock fell leading a desperate 
charge to retake Redan Battery, he gave Canadians an exemplary hero. Even today, the monument honoring 
Brock towers over the landscape, denoting the significance of the Battle of Queenston Heights in forging a 
new sense of Canadian identity. Throughout this historic engagement, Redan Battery played a pivotal role in 
the action for both American invaders and for British defenders and their allies. In 1975, Parks Canada 
archaeologist Elizabeth Snow excavated the battery to record the structural layout for restoration of the gun 
emplacement. Reviewing Snow’s archaeological site collection in preparation for the 200th anniversary of the 
battle, yielded unanticipated evidence of Brock’s fateful day, 13 October 1812.
 La bataille de Queenston Heights aura été le premier geste militaire posé la première année de la 
Guerre de 1812. Cette victoire consolidera les sympathies des Loyalistes de la région de Niagara à la cause 
Britannique et inspirera des unités de milice à s’opposer à l’invasion du Haut-Canada par les Américains. 
Quand le Major Général Isaac Brock est mort au combat alors qu’il menait une charge désespérée sur la bat-
terie Redan, il est devenu un héros exemplaire pour les Canadiens. Encore aujourd’hui, le monument érigé en 
l’honneur de Brock occupe une place imposante dans le paysage, reflétant le lien entre la bataille de 
Queenston Heights et le moment où est né un sentiment d’identité Canadienne. Tout au long de cet engage-
ment historique, la batterie Redan jouera un rôle central pour les envahisseurs Américains et les Défendeurs 
Britanniques de même que leurs alliés. En 1975, l’archéologue de Parcs Canada Elizabeth Snow a effectué des 
fouilles sur la batterie et a documenté sa configuration structurale en vue de la restauration de l’emplacement 
du canon. C’est en revoyant la collection archéologique pour le 200ième anniversaire de la bataille que des 
informations inattendues à propos de ce jour fatidique du 13 octobre 1812 ont été dévoilées.
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province was almost doubled from 1808 levels 
to 1,150 men and officers. Much needed 
military stores began arriving on the frontier 
as well, and militia commanders began 
reviewing their lists of 11,650 men, aged 16 to 
60, eligible for militia service. Still, the over 
1,000 mi. (1609 km) border in Upper Canada 
alone stretched these few military resources 
and, with the ongoing war in Europe, 
expectat ion of  further  Br i t ish  t roop 
reinforcements was slim (Latimer 2007: 37–45).
 Prevost was determined to hold Quebec at 
all costs and retained his major defense force 
in Lower Canada. He adopted, and strongly 
insisted upon, a cautious nonaggression 
policy, hoping diplomacy would prevail over 
military action until Britain could turn its 
attention back to British North America 
(Taylor 2011: 150; Turner 2011: 103).
 Perhaps Prevost’s most fortuitous choice 
was to appoint Isaac Brock to act as civil 
administrator for the province of Upper Canada 
(fig. 1). Brock had arrived in Canada in 1802 
with the 49th Regiment. He rose rapidly 
through the ranks in the ten years prior to the 
war. Made a colonel in 1805, Brock had 
opportunity to command at various posts in 
Upper and Lower Canada and by 1807, as 
brigadier general, he had acted as commander 
in chief of forces. Soldiers respected and liked 
Brock, and his experience made him a familiar 
figure in civil society (Malcomson 2003: 34–37).
 Hamstrung by Prevost’s nonaggression 
policy and the limited number of regulars at 
his disposal in Upper Canada, Brock had to 
make do with those resources available to him. 
In the early months of 1812, he made changes 
to the Militia Act, calling out volunteer flank 
companies in each militia regiment for 
training. The move proved popular, and the 
roster of volunteers swelled. In Loyalist Niagara, 
response was particularly enthusiastic, with 
five flank companies quickly filled and 
enough remaining to form the Niagara Light 
Dragoons, militia artillery, and a car brigade of 
artillery drivers (Malcomson 2003: 48). The local 
enthusiasm impressed Brock, but he remained 
doubtful of the militia’s determination to 
stand loyal against a seemingly overwhelming 
enemy force.
 Brock also courted support from aboriginal 
peoples in both Upper Canada and in the 
territories of the western Great Lakes. The terror 
that native warriors inspired in any enemy 
made a military alliance more significant than 
the number of warriors they supplied. Certainly, 
Brock wanted natives allied to the British rather 
than against them. Although the Six Nations 
Mohawk, led by John Norton, preferred to remain 
neutral at this point, Brock strongly advocated 
preemptive strikes against Mackinac and 
Detroit to seal an alliance with Tecumseh and 
his northern confederacy. The U.S. infantry and 
militia strike at the November 1811 Battle of 
Tippecanoe had infuriated the tribes, who now 
swore vengeance against land-hungry Americans 
(Berton 1980: 69–77; Turner 2011: 60).
 Prevost’s policy, prohibiting action that 
might incite war, tied Brock’s hands. Despite 
this, Brock anticipated likely border invasion 
points and parleyed with potential allies. His 
confidential correspondence with Robert 
Dickenson, an influential fur trader residing 
among the northwestern native bands, 
negotiated an alliance with the British. Months 
before the official war declaration, the warriors 
Figure 1. Portrait of Sir Isaac Brock, by John Wycliffe 
Lowes Forster (ca. 1875). (Image courtesy of Library 
and Archives Canada, e010767950).
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and Dickenson departed for the British post at 
Fort St. Joseph to await attack on the American 
outpost of Mackinac (Turner 2011: 95).
 News of the declaration of war traveled 
quickly to the Canadian frontier via fur trade 
correspondence. Word reached Fort St. Joseph 
on 3 July, five days before a dispatch from 
Brock reached Captain Roberts, commanding 
officer at that frontier post. Brock merely 
alerted him of the beginning of hostilities. 
Four days later, another message arrived from 
Brock advising Roberts of Prevost’s instruction 
to take no aggressive action, hoping the Americans 
would not act unless provoked. A week later, 
Brock again wrote Captain Roberts, telling him 
to “adopt the most prudent measures either of 
offense or defense which circumstance might 
point out” (Berton 1980: 109; Turner 2011: 113).
 With natives at his post restless for action, 
Roberts interpreted Brock’s instruction as 
permission to move against Mackinac (fig. 
2A).  The next day, 16 July, he set off with his 
small force of regulars reinforced by Dickenson’s 
nearly 300 tribesmen and a force of 180 volunteer 
voyageurs. They arrived at Mackinac before 
dawn and, with assistance from a local 
American fur trader, negotiated the complete 
capitulation of Fort Mackinac without a shot 
fired. Indeed, the fort captors informed 
Lieutenant Hanks, commanding officer at 
Mackinac, that war had commenced. He had 
received no news of the commencement of 
hostilities from his superiors (Taylor 2011: 153).
 Fortunately for Brock and Roberts, Prevost 
could not construe this invasion of American 
territory as a flash point to war as, four days 
prior, Brigadier General William Hull had 
crossed the Detroit River and placidly seized 
the village of Sandwich on the British shore 
(fig. 2B). From there, Hull issued a proclamation 
pressuring local settlers to remain neutral. He 
threatened severe consequences for anyone 
fighting on the side of the British and their 
native allies (Turner 2011: 115). The proclamation 
had considerable effect; over half the 
untrained militia deserted its posts. However, 
Hull had difficulty in retaining his long and 
vulnerable supply line and needed to provision 
his army. American raiding parties scoured the 
countryside, seizing farmers’ harvests and 
livestock, and burning and destroying crops 
and property. These acts turned local sentiment 
against the promised ideals of American 
liberty (Berton 1980: 136; Taylor 2011: 161). 
Discontent grew as Hull delayed at Sandwich 
awaiting artillery support before he would 
advance on the British fort at Amherstburg. 
Learning of the fall of Mackinac and advised 
that British reinforcements had arrived at 
Amherstburg, General Hull retreated across 
the river to Detroit, much to the consternation 
of his officers (Turner 2011: 123).
 Meanwhile, Isaac Brock arrived at 
Amherstburg with a small force of regulars and 
loyal militia from Niagara. He called a council 
of his officers and, despite their reservations, 
he ordered them to support his plan to invade 
Detroit straightaway. He addressed the allied 
native tribes and met with Tecumseh and the 
older chiefs to explain his strategy. Brock also 
issued a general order to the local populace 
and militia cowed by Hull’s proclamation. In it 
he expressed his surprise at the number of 
local militia desertions, but suggested the 
cause was more likely anxiety to harvest crops, 
rather than any “predilection for the principles 
or government of the United States” (Berton 
1980: 167). His cleverly phrased amnesty 
allowed the deserters to save face and united 
the local populace behind the British.
 With militia, native allies, and regulars, 
Brock led about 1,300 men. Hull at Detroit 
commanded more than 2,000. Boldly, Brock 
sent a message to Hull asking for the complete 
surrender of Fort Detroit. Hull was uncertain 
of the number of British regulars Brock 
commanded, for 300 militiamen wore cast-off 
41st Regiment uniforms. Brock had also tricked 
Hull into believing 5,000 warriors, en route 
from Mackinac, would soon arrive to support 
the invasion of Detroit (Latimer 2007: 67).
 Brock commenced an artillery attack in the 
afternoon of 15 August. That evening the native 
allies crossed the Detroit River to support the 
British landing at dawn. The crossing was 
uncontested. Brock took up a position in a 
ravine out of firing range and watched as native 
warriors looped past Fort Detroit three times, 
screeching war cries and waving tomahawks 
in full view of the fort garrison. Confused by 
the charade, U.S. officers estimated the warriors’ 
number at three times their actual strength 
and believed the Detroit garrison heavily 
outnumbered (Taylor 2011: 164) .
 Hull witnessed the British artillery attack 
taking its gruesome toll within the fort. With 
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Canadians of the viability of resisting 
American invasion. Native tribes settled in the 
Grand River area that initially had preferred to 
remain neutral now rallied behind the victors.
 The Detroit cache of arms and artillery, a 
brig, many smaller craft, and the captured 
supply train of pack animals, cattle, and 
provisions filled the military coffers and 
proffered considerable prize money to build 
morale among the troops (Berton 1980: 186; 
Taylor 2011: 165).
 Brock returned triumphant to Niagara, but 
there he learned of an armistice signed by 
Prevost and Major General Dearborn. The 
peace extended to 8 September, and Brock 
350 men of the Detroit garrison absent to escort 
a supply train, General Hull surrendered, 
swayed by fear of a native massacre of both 
soldiers and the civilian population sheltered 
within the fort (Stagg 2012: 65). His officers 
were aghast. For capitulating without a fight, 
General Hull would be court martialed. 
Acquitted of the charge of treason, the 1814 
court martial found him guilty of cowardice 
and sentenced Hull to be shot. President 
Madison finally pardoned Hull, who remained 
certain that he had followed the best course of 
action (Berton 1980: 188; Turner 2011: 147). The 
collapse of Hull’s army at Detroit enhanced 
Brock’s reputation and convinced many Upper 
Figure 2. Early military actions in the first year of the War of 1812 showing (A) allied British forces from Fort St. 
Joseph take Mackinac July 17; (B) Hull invades Canada from Detroit taking village of Sandwich on July 12, and 
Hull’s surrender and allied British forces take Detroit August 16; (C); Niagara frontier. Detail of the Map of the 
Seat of War in North America. John Melish Publisher, Philadelphia. (Image courtesy of Library and Archives 
Canada, National Map Collection 6760.)
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the attack. The success of this action put further 
pressure on Van Rensselaer to act. On 10 
October he ordered an assault on Queenston 
that night, but due to a mishap with the transport 
boats, the attack had to be postponed (Berton 
1980: 228; Turner 2011: 169).
 Warned of the failed mission by Captain 
Williams, stationed at Queenston Heights 
Cantonment, Brock arrived from Fort George 
near noon of the 11th to assess the situation. 
From a vantage point on the escarpment, Brock 
and his officers surveyed the setting, unaware 
that it would become a bloody battleground 34 
hours later. At Queenston, the fast-flowing 
Niagara River was only 250 yd. (228.6 m) 
across. Brock could clearly see Lewiston nestled 
above the riverbank, just downstream from 
Queenston Village. Williams directed Brock’s 
attention to a ravine above Lewiston, where 
his sentries had noted an increased concentration 
of American troops. As he gauged the scene, 
Brock knew the enemy had recently fortified 
Fort Gray, a battery on Lewiston Heights. It 
boasted two 18-pounders and was situated 
upstream of Redan Battery.
 Redan Battery stood on a ridge of the 
escarpment above Queenston Village and just 
below the cantonment on the heights. Named 
after the classic V-shape, (two faces forming a 
salient angle), it mounted an 18-pounder 
cannon and an 8 in. mortar. Below, by the 
village landing, stood an old stone blockhouse 
with a 9-pounder battery. About 2,000 yd. (1.8 
km) downstream, across from Lewiston, stood 
Vrooman’s Battery, armed with a 12-pounder 
and a 18-pounder cannon. Vrooman’s guns 
would be beyond range during the engagement 
(Malcomson 2003: 123; Latimer 2007: 74).
 Anticipating an attack soon, Brock returned 
to his Niagara headquarters at Government 
House, where he activated all available militia 
units. The next day he sent one of his senior 
officers, Major Evans, across the river to 
Lewiston to negotiate an exchange of prisoners 
taken during the action with Major General 
Van Rensselaer at Black Rock. Evans crossed at 
Queenston, but found his reception unusual. 
He reported being delayed at the landing and 
was then informed he would not be able to 
meet with the general until the next day. While 
waiting, Evans noted militia from Kentucky, 
Ohio, and Tennessee had strengthened the 
American forces. He also spied a line of bateaux 
feared the Americans only signed to buy time 
to reinforce their positions. Across the Niagara 
River, he could see a second U.S. army 
massing under the command of Major General 
Stephen Van Rensselaer. Brock knew an attack 
must come soon, but was uncertain where 
along the 35 mi. (56 km) stretch of the Niagara 
River the invaders would strike (fig. 2C) 
(Malcomson 2003).
 Unable to move against the enemy, Brock 
prepared his defenses. He gleaned intelligence on 
the American forces and sent for reinforcements 
under his command in Upper Canada at 
Amherstburg and Kingston. He intensified 
training and drilling of militia units, issued 
strategic orders outlining a signal warning system, 
and established fallback positions should 
attack occur at various points along the river.
 Only a few days before the Battle of 
Queenston Heights, Brock still expressed concern 
regarding the commitment of the militia to 
remain loyal should an invading force gain 
possession of the Upper Canadian shore along 
the Niagara River. He remarked: “[T]he enemy 
would obtain an advantage ... over the feelings 
of the militia that might be productive of fatal 
consequences if allowed to spread, the disaf-
fected will assume a tone and posture that cannot 
fail to operate in deterring the loyal from active 
exertion” (Brock 1920: 48). In the battle that 
would soon follow, Brock’s suspicion of Niagara 
settlers’ loyalty proved largely unfounded.
The Battle of Queenston Heights
 Deserters and informants from the American 
side kept Brock abreast of conditions of the 
enemy force across the river. As fall arrived 
with rain and inclement weather, sickness 
from want of clothing and shelter ravaged the 
U.S. camp. Discontent from lack of pay and 
action demoralized militia forces. Moreover, 
American command seemed fragmented. 
Brigadier General Smyth, at Black Rock near 
Buffalo, initially refused to meet or act in concert 
with Major General Van Rensselaer at Lewiston 
who was planning the attack on Queenston 
(Stagg 2012: 71). Acting independently of Van 
Rensselaer, Smyth approved a naval plan to 
seize two British schooners anchored near Fort 
Erie. Seizure of the vessels occurred on the 
night of 8 October, with one captured and one 
lost. Winfield Scott of the 2nd U.S. Artillery 
had just arrived at Black Rock and assisted in 
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following Lieutenant Gansevoort, who was 
somewhat familiar with the terrain, storm Redan 
Battery on the heights (Malcomson 2003: 142).
 By this time, Brock, aroused from his sleep 
at Government House in Niagara, had ridden 
to Queenston to reconnoiter the situation. The 
American 18-pounders at Fort Grey had 
silenced the Queenston Village 9-pounder. 
This relieved the American embarkation point, 
and a new wave of invaders, led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Fenwick, set out in five bateaux that 
had returned from the Canadian shore. 
Piloting themselves across, the strong current 
caught and carried them downstream to 
approach the shore at Hamilton Cove. Either 
Brock or Captain Dennis ordered Captain 
Williams light company down from Queenston 
Heights to address this new menace to the 
village. Fenwick’s force was cut to shreds, 
with many captured, wounded, or killed in the 
action (fig. 3C). Meanwhile, with no guard left 
on the heights above, Wool’s force attained the 
summit without being perceived and charged 
down on the Redan Battery from the rear. 
Surprised and overwhelmed, the British gunners 
fled, and Americans colors unfurled at the gun 
position (Malcomson 2003: 148–152).
 Brock’s own District General Order No. 7, 
prepared in early August, clearly stated that 
batteries should be defended “to the last 
extremity, but, in the event of any one being 
completely overpowered, the men defending 
such battery will fall back in a cool, regular 
manner” (Brock 1920: 19). Left unguarded 
when Brock or Dennis ordered Williams’s men 
down from Queenston Heights, Redan Battery 
was clearly not defended to the last extremity, 
and the gun crew’s retreat was probably neither 
cool nor regular.
 A somewhat dubious account suggests Brock 
was at Redan Battery when it was overpowered. 
This version records that the gun crew barely 
managed to spike the cannon touchhole with a 
ramrod before retreating (Berton 1980: 239). 
Another account implies the gunners did not 
spike the vent before fleeing (Malcomson 2003: 
156; Latimer 2007: 80).
 Brock’s immediate and impulsive attempt 
to retake the battery attests to the strategic 
importance of this high ground. In the immediate 
situation, had the Americans turned the gun 
on Queenston Village defenses, American 
reinforcements could have crossed the Niagara 
covered by brush on the shore (Malcomson 
1970: 125). Expecting imminent attack, Evans 
returned to alert troops at Queenston to be 
vigilant, then rode to inform Brock of an 
impending invasion. Brock warned his officers 
and sent messages to militia commanders to 
prepare their men (Turner 2011: 172).
 At Lewiston, Van Rensselaer felt pressure 
to act from his officers and ordered a second 
attempt on Queenston for before dawn of 13 
October. This left many of his supporting 
regiments, drenched and exhausted from the 
previous attempt, no time to recover. The 
American force also lacked sufficient supplies 
and ammunition, while the 13 available 
bateaux provided scant space to move an 
invading force, let alone artillery, across the 
Niagara River. Regardless, at 4 AM the first 
wave of about 300 invaders pushed off from 
the American embarkation point just south of 
Lewiston and touched the Canadian shore at a 
point 500 yd. (457 m) upstream of Queenston 
landing (fig. 3A). In the dark, a British guard 
on the bank fired into the boats, killing and 
wounding several men, then fled to raise the 
alarm (Malcomson 2003: 131–133).
 Captain Dennis of the 49th Regiment, 
supported by militia, fired on the invaders, but 
after a fierce musketry battle the Americans 
drove them back into Queenston Village (fig. 
3B). There the artillery was directing case shot 
against the U.S. embarkation point, causing 
havoc amongst the second wave of invaders 
awaiting transport. Above, on the heights, the 
18-pounder gun at Redan Battery harassed 
transport boats crossing the river. Several 
American officers, including Lieutenant 
Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, Stephen’s 
lead military advisor, suffered severe wounds 
in the initial exchange of musket fire 
(Malcomson 2003: 133–138). The other senior 
office in the first wave, Lieutenant Colonel 
John Chrystie, did not arrive to take command. 
Chrystie’s bateau had returned to the American 
shore after it drifted downstream and came 
under fire from the British near Hamilton Cove 
at the north end of Queenston Village.
 This tenuous situation left Solomon Van 
Rensselaer no option but to trust junior officers 
to carry the invasion forward until reinforcements 
could arrive. He ordered Captain John Wool 
and Captain Ogilvie of the 13th U.S. Infantry 
to lead a detachment of about 160 men and, 
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(fig. 3E). Here, the contradictory account of the 
spiking of the gun relates that an American 
spiked the 18-pounder during this second 
counteroffensive, when it appeared they would 
lose the position (Malcomson 2003: 156; Latimer 
2007: 80). Just as success appeared in their 
grasp, Macdonell fell mortally wounded, and 
Williams dropped, briefly knocked unconscious. 
The British offensive collapsed with some men 
captured and the remainder retreating to 
Queenston or west to the village of St. Davids. 
As U.S. reinforcements arrived, Wool ordered 
the gun drilled, but the invaders lost crucial 
time before it could be readied for service.
 The defenders fell back from Queenston 
Village, leaving Brock’s body hidden in a 
house. This left American forces a few hours to 
consolidate and reinforce their position with 
no opposition. U.S. regulars, along with about 
a quarter of the militia, eagerly crossed the 
river to take up positions. They shipped a 
6-pounder fieldpiece and accoutrements across 
the river and hauled it up the heights. As boats 
crossed with reinforcements, they returned 
carrying American dead and wounded within 
sight of the militiamen awaiting transport 
(Malcomson 2003: 164; Stagg 2012: 71).
unimpeded. Moreover, a consolidated American 
force on Queenston Heights would divide 
British forces and cut the supply line along the 
Portage Road. Without knowledge of the 
strength of the force at the battery, he acted 
immediately to right the situation.
 Brock gathered a small force of about 50 
men, including part of the 49th Regiment 
Light Company and members of the Lincoln 
and York militias, and led them in a desperate 
frontal counterattack on Redan Battery. Leading 
his force on foot up the slope, he presented an 
obvious target to an American infantryman 
who took aim and fatally shot him. Brock’s 
men carried  his body back to the village, 
where they concealed it (fig. 3D). Although the 
attack continued, the outnumbered defenders 
soon retreated, some to the village, while 
others followed Captain Williams to the west 
along the escarpment above the battery.
 As British reinforcements arrived at 
Queenston, including Brock’s aide-de-camp, 
Lieutenant Colonel John Macdonell, they 
joined Williams on the heights. With about 80 
men, they advanced down on Wool’s ensconced 
force. The British advance was strong enough 
to drive the invaders to the edge of the cliff 
Figure 3. The entire battle of Queenston Heights showing: (A) American invasion point above Queenston 
Village; (B) fierce musketry battle with the British driven back into Queenston; (C) Fenwick’s force floats down-
stream and are defeated at Hamilton Cove; (D) Brock leads a charge to retake Redan Battery and is killed; (E) 
Macdonell and Williams attempt to retake the battery; (F) American militia stand firm on American soil; (G) 
Sheaffe’s advance and the American retreat down the cliff. Detail of an oil painting by an unknown artist based 
on Major Dennis’s drawing of the battle, ca. 1815. (Courtesy of Riverbrink Museum, Queenston, Ontario 982.2).
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camp Macdonell was deeply grieved. They lay 
in state at Government House in Niagara until 
October 16. A long and formal procession 
followed their coffins to graves dug in a bastion 
at Fort George, while American cannon fired a 
courtesy salute to the British commander from 
Fort Niagara (Malcomson 2003: 193–197).
Excavation of the Redan Battery Structural 
Layout and Building Hardware
 The Battle of Queenston Heights played a 
decisive role in the first year of the War of 
1812. Inspired by their allied role in this victory 
and by the example of Isaac Brock, most 
Niagara settlers rallied behind the British 
cause and committed themselves to defending 
their homes against American invasion. Militia 
veterans, native allies, and their descendants 
celebrated their role in the defense and marked 
important battle places with monuments 
memorializing the triumph and its heroes. 
Indeed, Alexander Muir’s 1867 lyrics of “The 
Maple Leaf Forever,” praising the defenders at 
Queenston, became an unofficial anthem sung 
by Ontario schoolchildren well into the next 
century. The central role of Redan Battery in 
this historic event ensured it would be a focal 
point in the commemoration of the Battle of 
Queenston Heights.
 In the mid-20th century, the battery was a 
station in a walking trail designed for tourists 
to highlight the course of the battle. In 1975, 
Parks Canada proposed an upgrade to replace 
the then-current abstract marker with a more 
historically accurate one. With consent of the 
Niagara Parks Commission, which owned the 
property, Parks conducted research on the 
position and acquired an 18-pounder cannon 
for Redan Battery (Haldorson 1975).
 Prior to reconstruction, archaeologist 
Elizabeth Snow of Parks Canada excavated and 
recorded the battery site (fig. 4). Her 1975 report, 
“Salvage Archaeology at the Redan Battery, 
Queenston Heights”, details the structural 
layout of the gun position. Snow excavated the 
trace of the stone-revetted interior faces of the 
earth embankments and projected the configu-
ration of the 18-pounder cannon emplacement 
platform based on pine sleeper remnants 
resting on a clay and gravel base (fig. 5).
 Snow noted that all artifact material lay 
outside the platform footprint. The platform 
created a shadow effect, with artifact deposition 
 As morning passed, the British 41st Light 
Company reoccupied Queenston Village, 
allowing the artillery commander from Fort 
George to establish gun positions. Once again, 
British guns began harassing any bateaux 
attempting to cross the river. About this same 
time, on the heights, Norton and the Grand 
River warriors advanced on the defensive 
lines established by Winfield Scott, who had 
arrived and taken command from the less-
experienced militia commander William 
Wadsworth. Scott was successful in repelling 
the initial attack, but the warriors continued to 
fire on the American line. With the sounds of 
gunshot and war cries echoing across the river, 
nothing could now induce the militia to leave 
the safety of America soil for the invasion of a 
foreign shore. Of more than 3,000 militia 
present, only about 700 crossed in the assault 
(fig. 3F) (Malcomson 2003: 165).
 By early afternoon, British forces, reinforced 
by troops and militia from strong points along 
the Niagara, assembled and moved toward 
Queenston Heights. Around 3 PM the combined 
British force of 900 regulars, militia, and native 
allies, led by Major General Sheaffe, Brock’s 
second in command, advanced with field 
artillery and fired a volley at the American 
line. The U.S. force had now shrunk to about 
400, as men slipped away to hide below the 
cliff face. Those remaining fired a volley in 
return, then fell back in retreat, at first in an 
orderly fashion and then in frantic leaps down 
the cliff (fig. 3G). With no bateaux to effect an 
escape, some plunged into the fast-flowing 
river and drowned, or were shot while 
attempting to reach the far shore. Americans 
hoisted a surrender flag, but it went unnoticed 
until around 4 PM, when a repeated bugle call 
halted the fighting (Malcomson 2003: 181–191). 
British officers met to exchange congratulations 
at the battery, where Sheaffe received Brigadier 
General William Wadsworth’s sword, signifying 
the American surrender (Cruickshank 1902a: 7).
 Accounts of American dead and wounded 
from the battle vary widely, from 160 casualties 
to 500 killed and drowned alone. The British 
clearly documented the number of American 
prisoners taken for later prisoner exchange: 
436 regulars and 489 militia, 925 in total. British 
regulars, militia, and native allies sustained losses 
of 25 killed, 85 wounded and 22 captured, 
with an unknown figure of native wounded 
not tallied. The loss of Brock and his aide-de-
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wrought, 1.5 in. (3.5 to 4 cm) shingle/lathe 
nails in the assemblage, an excavated, large 
wrought-iron key, and a latch bar guide lend 
support to the presence of a subsidiary 
structure. Snow actually found the key 
secreted between the stones in the revetted 
battery wall, “obviously shoved into the crack 
for safe-keeping” (Snow 1975: 16). The hidden 
locale suggests the key unlocked the door of a 
nearby structure, possibly the expense 
magazine or, perhaps, a limber padlock (fig. 6).
 Parks Canada historians recovered an 1818 
plan of the Position of Queenston, by Captain 
found at the perimeter of the clay and gravel 
leveling fill. This fill defined the platform 
extent in areas where sleepers had been 
removed (Snow 1975: 13). Excavated bent and 
broken wrought spikes, and the lack of any 
trace of decking planks suggest the military 
dismantled the gun platform for salvage of 
reusable materials sometime after the war.
 Considering a number of wrought 2.75 in. 
(7 cm) to 3 in. (8 cm) nails, too small for use in 
a gun platform, Snow surmised the presence 
of another structure at the battery; possibly a 
field magazine (Snow 1975: 8). A quantity of 
Figure 4. Excavation recording at Redan Battery (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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Figure 5. Compilation of Figures 1 to 3 of Elizabeth Snow’s (1975) report showing: (A) projected configuration of 
the cannon platform, (B) excavation unit plan and features. (C) shows the remains of a platform sleeper supported 
on a stone slab in unit 22H2A. (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
Figure 6. Broken spikes from dismantling the cannon platform on left, nails too small for use in the platform on 
upper right and the wrought iron key found in a crack between the stones of the revetment. (Photo by author, 2013.)
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Figure 7. Detail of an 1818 plan of Queenston showing the crescent-shaped Redan Battery with a small building 
at the back and the post-battle Barrack and Fuel yard on the ridge above. Plan by Captain Vavasour, Royal 
Engineer. (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada, National Map Collection 22750.)
march from Chippawa to-morrow morning at 
daylight for the camp at Queenston” (Brock 
1920: 31). That Williams’s men were encamped 
on the heights implies that the barrack shown 
on the 1818 plan postdates the action. Another 
1812 account also notes 90 grenadiers of the 
49th Regiment housed in the stone barrack at 
Queenston Landing on the river shore below 
on the eve of the battle (Malcomson 2003: 123).
 The small structure behind Redan Battery 
(possibly indicating a traverse or an expense 
magazine to service the 18-pounder gun at this 
isolated position) may have been built when 
Vavasour of the Royal Engineers, after Snow 
completed her report. The plan shows a small 
structure immediately behind the crescent 
shape of the battery (fig. 7). A barrack and two 
structures, possibly a stable and privy, appear 
above the battery at the top of a path leading 
past a fuel yard. These structures, located in 
the current roadway lookout, decidedly postdate 
the Battle of Queenston Heights.
 Brock’s general orders, dated 8 October, 
five days before the U.S. invasion, direct 
“Captain Williams, of the 49th Regiment, with 
the light company under his command, will 
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the emplacement was first constructed or may 
also have been a post-battle addition.
 The Queenston Battery was one of the new 
positions Brock noted as recently completed in 
his July 1812 correspondence with Prevost. 
Brock described the battery as “strong, built of 
stone and will probably mount two or three 
pieces” (Malcomson 2003: 55). He does not 
mention a magazine, although the omission 
does not entirely discount its presence at that 
time. Still, at the time of the battle, munitions 
may simply have been stored in limbers 
behind the platform.
 Snow’s 1975 excavation affirmed the 
strength of the stone battery, but as her project 
focus was confined to establishing the line of 
the north and east faces, she did not test 
beyond that area. She did note a crescent-
shaped earthen berm “oriented in the same 
direction as the Redan Battery itself,” but did 
not test the feature (Snow 1975: 8). This mound, 
recorded on a 2011 plan, may represent a traverse 
to protect munition limbers, or a magazine 
sited near the base of the ridge to the southeast. 
It may also be a later site alteration (fig. 8). 
Lossing’s 19th-century accounts of the War of 
1812 note that “we passed a burying-ground 
which marks the site of the redan battery” 
(Lossing 1869: 413). The mound might relate to 
burials or to a later, 20th-century disturbance.
1812-Era Insignia
 Aside from recording the battery features 
and associated structural artifacts, Snow reported 
the recovery of 1812-era military insignia, 
munitions, food-related glass and ceramics, 
and miscellaneous artifacts. The presence of 
fragments of human bone, recently identified 
among her excavated faunal material (Berg 
2012), is a somber reminder of the carnage of 
war and of the sacred nature of battlegrounds.
 Perhaps the most evocative War of 1812–era 
artifact is a distorted, 41st Regiment uniform 
button. Along with his own 49th Regiment, Brock 
relied heavily on the steadiness of the veteran 
41st soldiers and assigned its noncommissioned 
officers the role of instructing inexperienced 
men of the militia units (Brock 1920: 39). In the 
summer and fall of 1812, Brock had detachments 
of the 41st Regiment spread along the Niagara 
River within four established divisions: First 
Division, Fort Erie and dependencies; Second 
Division, Chippawa and dependencies; Third 
Division, Queenston; and Fourth Division, Fort 
George and dependencies (fig. 9).
 During the Queenston engagement, the 
main body of the 41st Regiment served in the 
Second and Fourth Divisions, at Chippawa, 
Millers, and Navy Island, and at Fort George, 
respectively. Officers’ returns of casualties note, 
however: “Private Thomas Haynes 41st Regt. ... 
was kill’d in the Battery” (Smith 1812: 115). 
Day orders and accounts indicate Haynes was 
part of a detail of 10 members of the 41st 
employed in the service of the royal engineer at 
Queenston. The face of the coat closure button 
from a 41st Regiment uniform is concave as 
though hit by shot, and the button shank is 
heavily encrusted (fig. 10A).
 Haynes was the only specific member of 
the 41st known to have been killed at Redan 
Battery. The dislodged button might well signal 
Haynes final moment, although the regimental 
return of killed and wounded during the action 
records Haynes’s shared his fate with Sergeant 
Merryweather and David Jones, both of whom 
died of wounds through the body during the 
engagement. Nine other soldiers of the 41st 
received various nonfatal wounds to the 
abdomen, head, thigh, and leg during the action 
(Smith 1812: 125). For their part at Queenston 
Heights, both the 41st Foot and 49th Regiments 
received battle honors, adding “Queenstown” 
to their colors (Malcomson 2003: 213).
 On the day of the attack, Captain James 
Dennis of the 49th Regiment commanded 
Queenston Division. His troops incorporated 
184 men of the 49th Regiment, six Royal 
Artillery, plus the 10 members of the 41st. 
Completing the Queenston Division were 200 
militia, comprised of the 5th Lincoln Militia, 
the Lincoln Artillery, and the 2nd York Militia 
(Malcomson 2003: 272).
 An unmarked, pewter button of late 18th-
early 19th-century vintage recovered at the bat-
tery is likely associated with militia clothing 
(fig. 10B). Militia on both the British and U.S. 
sides often wore unmarked uniform buttons or 
civilian clothing. In the case of Private Thomas 
Smith of the 3rd York Militia, rushing to battle 
in unmarked civilian clothes had fatal conse-
quences. In the heat of Sheaffe’s counteroffensive, 
Norton’s warriors mistook him for an American 
militiaman and struck him down on Queenston 
Heights before his comrades could intervene 
(Malcomson 2003: 189). In the smoke and 
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Figure 8. Recent plan of the battery site showing an unidentified berm south of the platform. (Plan by author, 
2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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range (McConnell 1988: 319). After exiting the 
gun muzzle, the canister disintegrates, releasing 
a rapidly expanding cone of shot. Canister 
wreaks havoc among/against massed troops, 
but is only effective at close range, losing force 
beyond 300 yd. (274 m).
 The small size of the two shot (0.88 and 
1.11 in. diameter, or approximately 1½ and 2 
oz., respectively) implies use in a 3-pounder to 
6-pounder garrison-gun canister or a 3- to 12- 
pounder field-gun canister (fig. 11) (McConnell 
1988: 502). The 18-pounder Redan Battery 
garrison gun would have loaded canister 
packed with 62, 4 oz. shot or 82, 3 oz. shot, both 
appreciably larger than the examples recovered.
 Though it was fired against American 
troops embarked on the river, U.S. forces may 
never have employed the captured Redan gun 
against the British. Regardless of whether the 
British gun crew spiked it before retreating, or 
if an American put it out of commission 
during Macdonell and William’s counteroffen-
sive, Wool did not order his men to drill the 
gun and bring it to bear on the village until 
after the second attempt to retake the battery. 
Wool then retired to the American shore to 
have his wounds tended as Chrystie arrived to 
take command (Cruickshank 1902a: 155). 
Drilling a vent hole is time consuming. As no 
mention is made of U.S. fire on the village 
from the battery, they may not have completed 
confusion of battle, a uniform, even if only an 
arm band, symbolized allegiance and served 
the vital role of distinguishing friend from foe. 
A 1st Regiment, Royal Scots coat button was 
also recovered at the Redan Battery (fig. 10C). 
The Royal Scots did not arrive on the Niagara 
frontier until 1813, but participated in later 
engagements with distinction. The regiment 
won the battle honor “Niagara” for exemplary 
service in the battles of Chippawa, Lundy’s 
Lane, and at Fort Erie (Parkyn 1987: 69). 
During their tenure at Niagara, the Queenston 
and Redan batteries moved back and forth 
between American and British hands several 
times, with the Royal Scots garrisoning Redan 
Battery intermittently during this period 
(Cruickshank 1908). Ironically, an American 
account notes that on the first anniversary of 
the battle of Queenston Heights, with the British 
withdrawn to Burlington, “a small American 
militia force took possession of the ground 
without opposition” (Cruickshank 1907: 47).
1812-Era Munitions
 The military ammunition Snow retrieved 
during the battery excavation included two 
canister shot and two musket balls. Canister 
shot, consisting of a tin canister filled with 
cast-iron balls (or sand shot), is an antipersonnel 
device employed by ordnance firing at close 
Figure 10. Military buttons recovered at Redan Battery include; (A) 41st Regiment soldier’s coat button struck concave, 
(B) unmarked pewter button typical of that worn by militia on both sides of the engagement; and (C) 1st Regiment 
Royal Scots coat button. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada)
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American 6-pounder or the British 3-pounder 
field guns could fire the size of the canister 
shot found by Snow. However, the battle 
action and in situ War of 1812–context imply 
that they issued from a British muzzle as 
Sheaffe’s force advanced on the American 
position at Redan Battery.
 Musket balls retrieved during the excavation 
represent both sides of the engagement (fig. 
12). One is a .75-caliber British ball, the other a 
.69-caliber American ball for the French caliber 
muskets carried by American forces. U.S. 
cartridges contained either buckshot or a ball 
surmounted by three buckshot.
 The return of captured American long arms 
at Queenston included 435 French carbine 
muskets, 380 bayonets, 141 bayonet scabbards, 
325 ammunition pouches, and a cache of nearly 
6,000 musket cartridges, nearly half with ball and 
buckshot, and the remainder with buckshot only 
(Cruickshank 1902a: 75). Eyewitness accounts 
of the height of battle describe a hail of bullets. 
Lieutenant Ridout of the 3rd York Militia wrote: 
“[T]he discharge of small arms, the whizzing of 
the balls and yells that issued from all quarters, 
exceed description” (Malcomson 2003: 189).
 An eerie association exists between the 
U.S. ball shot recovered at the battery and the 
the task before the British counteroffensive 
that afternoon.
 As the invaders watched Sheaffe’s force 
approach, John Lovett of the U.S. Artillery 
rode to Fort Gray on the American shore 
opposite Queenston. Hoping to fire on the 
British column 500 yd. away, he ordered his 
18-pounder guns loaded with grape- and solid 
shot. Before they came into range, however, 
the British passed behind the cliff, thwarting 
his attempt to provide artillery support to 
isolated U.S. forces on the heights. Lovett 
watched helplessly as both sides opened with 
“fixed cannon, flying artillery and the roll of 
musketry.” He recounted: “The mountain 
seemed to shake beneath the stride of death” 
(Cruickshank 1902a: 87).
 British forces advanced with two, 3-pounder 
field guns. As they forced the invaders back to 
the cliff edge, they encountered the American 
6-pounder field gun that had been transported 
across the river and hauled up the heights that 
morning. In the smoke of battle, it stood aban-
doned with all its accoutrements and ammunition 
wagon containing 4 rounds of fixed shot and 14 
rounds of canister (Cruickshank 1902a: 75).
 U.S. artillery munitions conformed to the 
British caliber system of 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-, and 
18-pounder guns (Graves 1984: x). Either the 
Figure 11. Cast iron canister shot of 2 and 1 ½ ounce gauge. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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Figure 12. Lead British .75 caliber shot and U.S. .69 caliber shot from buck and ball cartridge. (Photo by author, 
2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
Figure 13. U.S. .69 caliber shot exactly fits the contorted face of the 41st Regiment button. (Photo by author, 2012; courtesy 
of Parks Canada.)
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distorted 41st Regiment button (fig. 
13). Excavators found both button and 
ball in the same context. After 
conservation treatment, a clearly 
delineated facet on the shot surface 
matched the indentation in the 
contorted button face. The effect of 
forceful impact shaping these two 
objects must have been transmitted to 
the soldier who wore the 41st 
Regiment uniform, very probably 
Private Thomas Haynes, who died at 
the battery as Wool’s force swept 
down on the gun crew.
1812-Era Human Remains
 Human remains identified during 
2012 faunal analysis include two 
fragments from a left tibia (probably 
from the same bone), and two fragments 
of fibula, one from near the distal end 
of a left fibula and the other from the 
proximal end of a right fibula (fig. 14). 
They probably represent one individual 
(Berg 2012: 2), but confirmation would 
require DNA analysis. All the lower-
leg bones came from excavation unit 
22H2A, an area previously disturbed 
by installation of the Parks Canada 
trail monument and Niagara Parks 
Commission survey marker. Given 
the battlefield context, it is likely the 
bones represent shattering of limbs in 
action with further breakage by surface 
trampling. Disturbance of a shallow 
burial is a possibility, though lack of 
other skeletal elements argues against 
this. Still, Snow did note a possible stone 
feature disturbed by 20th-century 
intrusions, and Lossing’s account does 
mention burials marking the location 
of the battery (Lossing 1869: 413; 
Snow 1975: 13).
 Whether the four fragments of 
human bone found among the battery 
debris represent a British regular, native 
warrior, local militia, an American 
casualty, or several individuals 
remains unknown. The battlefield 
context supports the assumption that 
the leg bones represent casualties, 
and horrific carnage on War of 1812 
sites is well-documented (Litt, 
Williamson, and Whitehorne 1993).
Figure 14. Human leg bones recovered at Redan Battery include 
fragments of left and right fibula and two fragments of tibia 
ranging in length from 4.7cm to 6.7cm. (Photo by author, 2012; 
courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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sherds represent only one painted pearlware 
tea vessel and a creamware plate. A fragment 
of a lead-glass tumbler base is the only other 
formal 1812-vintage tableware recovered (fig. 
15A). Men may have received their rations at 
the cantonment on the heights above, although 
the presence of faunal debris suggests men 
posted at the battery ate there. Tinware may 
have been more common than ceramics at this 
posting. Snow did recover two fragments of a 
large, early 19th-century tin pan with a rolled-
wire rim typical of the 1812 era (fig. 15B). She 
also recovered an nondiagnostic base fragment 
of a cast-iron pot or kettle. Prepared rations 
may have been carried in these containers to 
men on duty.
1812-Era Miscellaneous Material
 A fragment of a brass jaw harp and a few 
nondescript white-clay pipe-stem fragments 
hint at less-eventful moments during military 
 Accounts of the Battle of Queenston Heights 
aftermath tell of the dead lying on the battlefield 
overnight. The next day, when General Van 
Rensselaer wrote to request the return of the 
American dead to their shore, he learned the 
British had already interred the remains at 
Queenston. At dawn, a detail of soldiers of the 
49th had collected bodies for burial and grimly 
reported many stripped of clothing and equip-
ment, and some scalped. In the grisly setting, 
one might easily overlook small fragments of 
humanity trampled among the battlefield 
debris. An American rifleman who survived 
the ordeal expressed the feelings of many of his 
comrades when he wrote: “Thanks be to God, that 
my bones are not now bleaching on the awful 
Heights of Queenston” (Malcomson 2003: 195).
1812-Era Food-Preparation/Service Material
 Domestic artifacts are exceedingly sparse 
in the battery assemblage. Five small ceramic 
Figure 15. Domestic debris recovered at the battery includes; (A) a few fragments of pearlware and creamware 
ceramics and a lead glass tumbler base; (B) large tin pan; (C) undiagnostic pipe stem fragments and a portion of 
the bow of a jaw harp frame shown with a complete example; and (D) a fragment of a small chisel and a tool 
tang fragment. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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service at Redan Battery (fig. 15C). Finally, two 
wrought-iron artifacts, originally identified by 
Snow as spikes, are tools. One is a small firmer 
chisel and the other an unidentified tool-handle 
tang (fig. 15D).
1812-Era Faunal Assemblage
 Snow retrieved an assemblage of food-related 
bone, accounting for over a third of the Redan 
Battery assemblage. The presence of the faunal 
debris implies that men on duty ate at the 
emplacement. Once the military built barracks 
on the ridge above, men may have received 
their rations there, hence the bone debris is 
likely associated with the war era.
 Faunal analysts interpreting British military 
contexts have built upon the seminal work of 
Wilson and Southwood (1976) at Fort George. 
Questions raised by Wilson about identifying 
the source of meat, and, in particular, the issue 
of fresh- vs. salt-meat provisions, found potential 
answers in Burns’s (1983) listing of statutes from 
Upper and Lower Canada and the Maritime 
Legislatures. These rules on bulk packaging 
date from 1758 to 1867 and describe the type of 
barrel, inspection requirements, labeling, and 
content quality for various grades of produce. 
The 1805 statute from Upper Canada and the 
similar 1804 statute for Lower Canada are 
frequently cited for War of 1812 faunal studies 
(Berg 2010, 2012; Rick 1993).
 Quality levels for pickled beef specify 
animals aged three years or more, and divide 
the 12 to 4 lb. portion requirement into “mess 
beef,” “prime beef,” and “cargo beef.” Graduated 
amounts of less desirable portions, such as the 
neck, appear in descending grade order. No 
heads or hocks are to be included in any grade 
of salt beef. Pickled pork is also divided into 
mess, prime, and cargo pork. Prime includes 
only ribs of “good fat hogs” of 100 lb. or more, 
while cargo allows for “not more than two 
heads weighing a maximum of 25 lb. with ears 
snout brain and bloody grizzle removed.” No 
grade of pork allowed legs. The long list of 
commodities transported in barrels does not 
include mutton, which was not suitable for 
salting (Burns 1983: 4–7; Rick 1993: 32).
 In the battery assemblage, over half the 162 
food-related bones could be cross-mended, with 
their breakage largely attributed to trampling 
after discard. One third exhibited cleaver or ax 
marks from processing, with no saw or knife-
cut marks (Berg 2012: 4).
 Combinations of sawn and chopped 
processing are often characteristic of British 
military rations. The commissary often pur-
chased fresh and barreled meat sawn into 
quarters by suppliers. Quartermasters reduced 
meat further by chopping into mess issue for 
about 12 men, while splitting into rations (of 
approximately 1 lb. of meat per man) with 
further cutting for stewing resulted in smaller 
Figure 16. Food-related faunal material recovered from Redan Battery includes; (A) beef leg and rib bone, (B) sheep/
goat, (C) young pig scapula, and (D) white-tailed deer bone. (Photo by author, 2012; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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 The situation at Niagara was unlike isolated 
Fort St. Joseph, where salt pork and peas 
dominated the diet. Here fresh meat was easily 
accessible from the burgeoning settlements 
and via water transport. Seasonality and 
wartime necessity would diminish availability 
of fresh supply, and quantities of salt pork and 
beef are listed among stores captured at Fort 
George in 1813 (Wilson and Southwood 1976: 
123; Cumbaa 1979: 19).
 The sheep/goat in the assemblage is 
frequently found in military contexts and 
likely represents a local source, while the 
white-tailed deer bone suggests hunting or 
perhaps purchase of venison. The piglet less 
than three months in age may reflect illicit 
scavenging of nearby settlers’ livestock, an 
activity frequently documented during the 
pieces (Wilson and Southwood 1976: 130; 
Cumbaa 1979: 19; Berg 2010: 20).
 Analysts conclude that animal species, age, 
presence/absence of certain portions, and a 
combination of sawn and cut processing can 
be suggestive of fresh vs. salt meat. Among 
identified species found at Redan Battery, 
cattle bones are predominant, followed by pig, 
then sheep/goat, and one deer (fig. 16). Two of 
the cattle fragments are from lower-leg bones 
(normally not packed in salt beef), suggesting 
the Queenston Division enjoyed at least some 
fresh beef. The pig dentary bones in the sample 
do not have their anterior ends chopped off, as 
would be expected in the removal of the snout 
for barrel provision; and a scapula from a piglet 
too young for salt preservation also suggests 
fresh pork (Berg 2012: 5).
Figure 17. Detail of Queenston Military Reserve showing encroachments by the Erie and Ontario Railway. 
Railway shed (No 10) is immediately NW of the no longer extant battery although the Old Barrack (No. 12) 
remains intact. Plan by Lt. Colonel Vavasour, Royal Engineers, 26 October 1850. (Image courtesy of Library and 
Archives Canada, National Map Collection 4351).
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Canadian of planting the bomb in revenge for 
the death of a relative killed during the 1837 
Rebellion in Upper Canada. The act outraged 
the community, and a committee began raising 
funds by subscription for a new monument. 
By 1853, they raised enough money to erect an 
even more impressive 185 ft. (56 m) high 
monument built west of the old column, 
which was then demolished. Again, the battle 
anniversary, 13 October, marked the date of 
the official ceremony to reinter Brock and 
Macdonell. A crowd of 12,000–15,000 attended, 
and, once again, patriotic speeches honored 
veterans of the battle and of the War of 1812 
(fig. 18).
 Despite the nearby encroachment on military 
reserve lands by the Erie and Ontario Railway 
indicated on the 1850 plan, the installation of 
interpretive markers, and visitation to the site 
by tourists following the course of the battle, 
surprisingly little mid-19th- to 20th-century 
debris was recovered (Plousos 2012). Following 
Snow’s 1975 excavation, Parks Canada removed 
the abstract monument and installed the 
reconstructed platform and 18-pounder cannon 
(fig. 19). Under agreement with the Niagara 
Parks Commission (the property owner), staff 
of Parks Canada, Niagara National Historic 
Sites, maintains the cannon emplacement as a 
significant place commemorating the Battle of 
Queenston Heights.
war. In 1814, General Drummond complained 
of the Royal Scots behavior being “more that 
of a plundering banditti than of British 
soldiers employed for the protection of the 
country and its inhabitants” (Cruickshank 
1908: 208).
Redan Battery in the Post–War of 1812 Era
 As Elizabeth Snow surmised, the lack of 
decking and the broken spikes in the 
assemblage indicate that the military 
dismantled Redan Battery sometime after the 
War of 1812. The battery is no longer present 
on a detailed 1850 plan of the Queenston 
military reserve. Only the old barrack above 
the battery location is still extant at mid-
century (fig. 17). Royal Engineer Henry 
Vavasour prepared both this plan and the 
earlier 1818 map, indicating on both the place 
where Brock fell. By 1850, Vavasour was a 
lieutenant colonel, having returned to Canada 
after a long absence (Woodward 2011).
 Vavasour’s second plan locates the original 
monument honoring Brock and Macdonell, 
whose bodies had been reinterred on Queenston 
Heights with all due ceremony on 11 October 
1824. A large crowd, including many veterans 
of the war, turned out for the occasion. The 
monument, a 135 ft. (41.2 m) tall column with 
an observation platform at the summit, was 
bombed in 1840. Authorities suspected an Irish 
Figure 18. Brock Monuments showing (A) the original 1824 monument in an engraved print drawn by W. H. 
Bartlett circa 1840 (National Art Gallery No. 39303) and (B) a 20th-century photograph of the 1853 Brock 
Monument (Courtesy of the Department of the Interior, Canada, and Library and Archives Canada, PA 048140).
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Figure 19. Redan Battery showing (A) the pre-1975 abstract sculpture marking point 5 of the Queenston walking 
tour (Parks Canada). (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.) (B) is a recent site image 
showing the current 18-pounder cannon emplacement. (Photo by Joseph Last, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.).
Conclusions
 The British success in the first year of the 
War of 1812 was, in part, an expression of poor 
communication and botched incursions by the 
invaders. As the war began, the American 
military lacked organization, and political 
rivalries between commanders resulted in lack 
of coordinated effort with disastrous results. 
They quickly learned from these errors. The 
British regular force in Upper Canada was 
sparse and spread along a vast border. The 
brilliant commander, Isaac Brock, inspired and 
trained local militia units, forged alliances with 
native allies, and achieved considerable success 
by bold action. In so doing, he convinced local 
inhabitants, particularly those in the Niagara 
region, that invasion could be successfully 
resisted.
 The Battle at Queenston Heights was a 
proving ground for British regulars, militia, 
and native allies, who fought together to resist 
the invading force. Their concerted effort and 
participation in the victory established a new 
sense of national pride. Brock’s death leading a 
charge to retake Redan Battery gave locals a 
hero to emulate and memorialize in speeches, 
monuments, anthems, and historic lore.
 Elizabeth Snow’s detailed 1975 excavation 
report on the Redan Battery and associated 
strata provided firm data for reconstruction of the 
cannon platform for the Queenston battle walking 
tour. Though the archaeological collection she 
recovered is small, relics from the War of 1812–
era truly elicit a sense of the height of a battle 
fought and won at Queenston Heights. Viewing 
these artifacts within the battle context enhances 
their meaning, for they are truly evocative of a 
place where guns roared and heroes fell.
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